Ethos and reform of finance systems, a tentative argument by Morgan, JA
real-world economics review, issue no. 58 
 
Ethos and reform of finance systems, a tentative argument  
Jamie Morgan   [University of Helsinki, Finland]  
Copyright: Jamie Morgan, 2011 
You may post comments on this paper at 
http://rwer.wordpress.com/2011/12/12/rwer-issue-58-jamie-morgan/ 
 
 
 The idea of regulation as part of creating a practically operative system of finance 
opens up the issue of the ethos of the system. Behaviours and practices within a system are 
conditioned by more than the individual institutional forms within which those behaviours and 
practices occur: specific habits, laws, rules and so forth. They are conditioned by the more 
general oxygenation of those institutional forms: the bias of principle within the system i.e. it’s 
ethos. Games have an overall complexity that makes sense of their individual rules. Social 
forms and specific systems have an ethos that colours what habits, laws and rules exist and 
how they are followed and iterated. This in part flows from dominant knowledge forms and 
what they tend to suggest regarding the nature and need for regulation.  
 
 A key aspect of a private finance organization is to adapt itself to the control 
mechanisms placed upon it i.e. in a negative sense to subvert the intention of the regulation 
that exists and also seek out gaps, lacunae etc in the regulation that exists.1 A question one 
might apply here is what ethos does this tendency rely upon?  One might state that it relies 
upon an ethos whose balance is towards whatever is not formally prevented is allowed. 
However, in so far as this ethos is a bias of principle it is not a rigid principle. As a systemic 
ethos it is multiple in its manifestations and thus blurred in its real meaning if not its 
substantive definition. The ethos that whatever is not formally prevented is allowed has not, 
for example, always been the absence of the seeking of permissions but rather a way in 
which inquiry is situated and actions justified.  
 
 One of the key underlying causes of the Global Financial Collapse (GFC) was the 
growth of credit derivatives – the use of credit default swaps and the growth of synthetic 
CDOs, specifically based on mortgage-backed assets. Credit derivatives were an innovation 
developed between 1991 and 1995. They were originally focused around collectivised 
corporate lending (which has very different characteristics than collectivised mortgages). They 
were intended to do three things for the originating banks. They created a new profit source 
by extending the possibilities of ‘intra-financial’ multiplication. They moved risk off a financial 
organization’s balance sheet because any underlying default had been passed on, either to 
the counter-party in a credit default swap or to the holder of a constructed asset such as a 
synthetic CDO. And they created the potential for a financial organization’s capital reserves to 
be proportionally reduced based on the reduction in ‘risk exposure’ because underlying 
defaults had been passed on (in turn allowing greater volumes of lending). In the context of 
capital reserve regulation, reducing capital reserves because of a financial innovation 
required permission from the relevant authority.2 In the US capital reserves were overseen by 
                                                 
1 Note that ‘subvert’ does not always entail an intent that is subversion but rather an outcome that has 
subverted. The context in which some given focus is considered to be subversive can be various (up to 
and including the eventual systemic significance of practices or products. 
 
2 The 1988 Basel 1 accord stipulated an 8% capital reserve (weighted for risk). This 8% essentially 
represented the expected risk of losses i.e. what would need to be covered if loans went bad. It then 
followed that if a credit derivative was constructed that removed the risk of 8% of the volume of any 
given lending to another party then that derivative had effectively offset the risk represented by the 
capital reserve, removing the need for that capital reserve (since the anticipated losses based on 
defaults would be absorbed by other parties rather than the originating bank). Banks could thus radically 
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the Fed and by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC). In 1996 the Fed 
indicated that credit derivatives could be used to reduce capital reserves. What is significant 
here is that permission was not in the context of whether credit derivatives were allowable but 
rather what credit derivatives would then allow a financial organization to do. The innovation 
was in a primary sense uncontested. There was no clear sense in which it first had to be 
allowed because this was systemically required. There was nothing to prevent it thereafter 
being extended to mortgage markets based on completely different underlying characteristics. 
  
 Furthermore, the fact that it did not first have to be permitted was one situated to the 
way in which dominant knowledge affected the shape of finance markets. Derivatives in 
general had become a subject of regulatory debate in the early 1990s, and there was growing 
criticism of the problems they might create when in 1994 the Fed unexpectedly shifted the 
direction of interest rate policy causing losses on interest rate swaps that affected local 
government funds in the US that had used them as investment tools. Despite these problems 
derivatives markets remained self-regulated using rules initially devised by the International 
Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA). They were thus formally unregulated by anything 
other than ‘the market’. The ISDA, moreover, was able to resist a series of attempts to impose 
formal regulation over the next decade. It was aided and abetted in this by the deep 
ontological role of ‘market efficiency’ discourse thinking in symbiosis with ethos.  
 
 The ethos of whatever is not formally prevented is allowed flows from a predominant 
emphasis on negative liberty. Negative liberty is freedom from constraint or interference in 
one’s decisions and conduct. This predominance prioritises liberty, in an economic sense, as 
a space energised by entrepreneurial activity. It presupposes that change is beneficial 
providing innovation with positive connotations. Those positive connotations imbricate with 
the mechanisms of an idealised market: the process of selection of innovation is competitive 
and competitive processes are disciplined to produce economic goods that are also social 
goods. In the case of derivatives prior to the GFC, regulation was considered not to be 
required because expert counter-party surveillance was held to create discipline at the same 
time as derivatives themselves create a product for risk dispersion that actually helps to 
complete the efficiency of all other markets by placing risk where it is most appropriately held 
(by those who rationally choose it based on good information and sound contracts). One can 
then readily see how there is a mutuality between specific approaches to regulation, general 
dominant knowledge forms, and the bias of principle in the system. These combine to 
continue to shape that system as a real process.  
 
 If one considers the effects of ethos on the system then whatever is not formally 
prevented is allowed creates particular problems for the context of reform of the finance 
system. If there is no primary systemic injunction regarding new practices and products then 
the need for permissions is piecemeal. As such the scope for scrutiny of products and 
                                                                                                                                            
reduce their capital reserves whilst only passing on a small proportion of the original lending in some 
form through credit derivatives. This potentially enabled great expansions in lending  (based on freed 
capital as well as wholesale sources) whilst keeping 92% of the lending risk on the books. However, 
since actual volumes of lending could then increase greatly the absolute levels of losses if defaults (or in 
fact simply writedowns if assets with mark-to-market values are involved) exceeded 8% could be large 
and could be uncovered by any capital reserve (this was termed ‘super-senior risk’). Thus, the existence 
of credit derivatives opened up a whole new form of real risk exposure in the name of precise risk 
management. The actual basis of this was slightly modified since the OCC and Fed required the banks 
to hold 20% of the 8% i.e. instead of $80,000 per $1m, $16,000 per $1m and required the credit 
derivatives on which the transmission of risk was based to involve AAA ratings. This began the pressure 
on credit rating agencies to produce high ratings for credit derivatives and was also one reason why the 
banks began to look for ways of justifying high ratings for these new products.  
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practices as they emerge is fractured and the scope for those products and practices to 
become embedded, despite any adverse potential they may have, is actually ingrained in the 
system. Moreover, if there is no primary systemic injunction then it follows that there is no 
necessary presumption that private financial organizations must seek a relevant regulatory 
body to pass judgement on new practices and products or, if none exists, highlight that none 
exists, because the ethos of the system makes it necessary that they do so. They may 
manufacture their own organization as a legitimating entity but this is not the same. 
Furthermore, if the prevailing ethos is whatever is not formally prevented is allowed then once 
practices and products are within the system there is no necessary basis for limitations on the 
extension of those practices and products to new areas of business. In all these cases, 
injunction relies specifically on the existence of specific organizations with specific remits that 
are already targeting specific potential problem areas. As such, ethos as an aspect of the 
design of the system itself is not an aid to organizational form for regulation and supervision 
but an actual hindrance to it. 
 
 This hindrance effect manifests itself in multiple problems for the role of information in 
the system of regulation. It creates a problem because available information can be 
disempowered. The ethos of the system leads to a situation where the remit of each 
organization is likely to have to involve highly specific codifications of powers to impose 
effects on private financial organizations. This is because the burden or obligation of 
regulation rests with the stated duties of the regulator rather than is inhered in general 
obligations or duties imposed on the regulated. They are free to act except where constrained 
rather than required to constrain themselves except where freed to act. As such, regulators 
are motivated to create highly specified powers of constraint to target specific activities as 
they occur and those regulated are prompted to respond by viewing regulation as exactly that 
set of specified powers that can be evaded precisely by relying on what is not in those 
specifications. They can adhere to the letter but evade the intent because the systemic bias of 
principle enables this or they can step outside the letter because where the target is not 
aimed is free space. In either case, the information focus of the regulator can disempower 
that regulator by the way in which information is systemically operative – it becomes a tool of 
manipulation.       
 
 Not only can available information be disempowered, information itself can be made 
unavailable since it is effectively privatised by the presumption of the bias of principle in the 
system. One aspect of organizational reform of regulators is to extend their coverage to more 
kinds of financial organization: hedge funds, private equity etc. Another is to require greater 
transparency from these, including information on trading positions. The problem remains that 
effectiveness inheres in the effectiveness of the regulatory organization rather than in the 
system. That effectiveness is subject to the possibility of blind spots – particularly if the basis 
is a new kind of financial organization not currently specified (in the way say SIVs were new a 
decade ago). Moreover, even though specific organizational reforms are moves towards more 
available information this need not be the reversal of the privatisation of information because 
what the reforms ultimately involve is a requirement to produce data for the regulator from 
which strategies can be inferred and from which ideas about practices and the effects and 
flows of products can be constructed. The presumption is not that a practice or product is not 
allowed until such time as it has been fully justified and then permitted. At best, the inquiry 
concerns how the products and practices are already being used.     
 
 The net effect is that ethos has been a contributor to the widely recognized 
phenomena that regulation has tended to find itself fighting the last war. Regulation has been 
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oriented on the specific problems of the previous period of recognized instability and its 
manifestations of crisis. This has led to the view that regulators are trapped in an arms race 
with the regulated, constantly responding to what has been done rather than what is being 
done. This has created scope for critique of pervasive regulation on the basis that it is often 
ineffectual because it is backwards looking and it is potentially dangerous because in 
intervening to meet old problems that markets have or would have rectified themselves it has 
simply created a new distortion from which further subversions flow to create new adverse 
outcomes (regulators are responsible for the next phase of instability).  
 
 So, ethos is an important issue to explore because it is a prime source of analysis for 
how a system creates a context for regulation, information, and the discursive critique of the 
imposition of regulation. A focus on ethos allows one to look at these in a different way. In 
each case a primary problem is the systemic presumption that change is allowed unless 
formally prevented.    
  
 One way forward is to explore the implications of reversing the dominant ethos to 
create a systemic bias of principle based on whatever is not formally allowed is prevented. 
Doing so would create a quite different framework in which private finance organization 
activity tended to pursue subversive adaptations to control mechanisms placed upon them. 
The ethos of the system would constitute a counter-balance to this tendency in various ways. 
The need for permissions would no longer be piecemeal but rather ingrained in the system. In 
this framework permissions would come before implementations rather than as a corollary to 
some aspect of implementation. This would also hold for extensions of practices and products 
to new areas of business. Not only would the privatisation of information be reversed but the 
tendency for information to be disempowered would also be balanced.  
 
 If the ethos were what is not formally allowed is prevented then injunction would not 
rely on the existence of specific organizations and there would be an obligation on private 
financial organizations to seek out an organization or highlight its lack. Moreover, since the 
nature of obligation was general to the system and, the burden or weight of obligation or duty 
rested with the regulated rather than the regulator, then regulation could more easily become 
general in its form without losing effectiveness in its expression. The regulated would be 
required to constrain themselves except where free to act. The regulated would, therefore, be 
the one now pushing for clarification and would be the one offering more information and 
argument. In so far as this shift is possible then the regulator would not be trapped in an arms 
race with the regulated in quite the way that has been the case over the period of liberalised 
finance. Their relationship would be repositioned, giving the issue of the specific design of 
regulation for finance new inflections.  As such the meaning frame within which actual real 
stability-instability processes occurred in a market system would be changed. It would then 
follow that the basis of any process of interventional stabilisation would be altered. 
Furthermore the possibility that problems could be foreseen would become a quite different 
issue because the shape of the system within which forecasting occurred would be 
qualitatively affected.   
 
Key here is whether ethos as an aspect of the design of the system itself is now an aid rather 
than a hindrance to the organizational form of regulation and supervision. There are two 
challenges here, a negative and a positive one. The negative one is the counter-argument 
that an ethos of whatever is not formally allowed is prevented creates an overly bureaucratic 
system that is sclerotic, expensive to administer, overly conservative, subject to capture by 
the needs and interests of administrators, and replaces the good self-interested decisions of 
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market participants with the poor uninterested decisions of state (or other political entity’s) 
employees. These are all potential problems but not necessarily actual problems. Whether 
they are depends upon the way the ethos can be and is inhered in the system. This is the 
positive challenge. It rests on a combination of changes to law and changes to organizations 
based on a clear overall attempt to cohere change in terms of the reversal of ethos.  
 
 For example, one might think about the use of principles of jurisdiction to provide 
concrete expressions of ethos. If a particular form of practice or product has not been allowed 
in a jurisdiction then the construction of a contract that then tries to enact it within that 
jurisdiction or based on original assets within that jurisdiction can be deemed unenforceable. 
This would create sufficient ambiguity such that counterparties or clients would be extremely 
disinclined to enter into contracts under these conditions. The jurisdiction need do no more 
than this. Clients and counterparties may undertake and fulfil contracts but will do so in a void 
that is quite different than liberalised finance where the absence of the state from the market 
is still a tacit guarantee of the market (a simulation of trust because of the legal infrastructure). 
Here the legal infrastructure removes that simulation and thus by actively doing nothing the 
law fails to tacitly guarantee the market.  
 
 A more fundamental reply to the negative challenge is to question the basis on which 
the ethos of whatever is not formally prevented is allowed provides a means to question the 
need for a practical expression of the alternative ethos. Whatever is not formally prevented is 
allowed is an ethos that relies upon markets simulating processes that they don’t actually 
engage in. Efficiency assumes that markets demand and receive information and use it on an 
individual basis for individual purposes in a way that produces a collective outcome that is in 
some sense the best that could be attained (where best means optimal or if not optimal then 
better than what would be achieved through some non-market process). In essence the 
presumption is that market actions simulate what a collective discussion would agree to be 
the ideal economic and social outcome and this obviates the need for such discussion. This is 
conceptually problematic and manifestly empirically questionable.   
 
 What a reversal in ethos does is actually create conditions for such a collective 
discussion where that information can be genuinely put to collective debate and scrutiny. It 
replaces blind calculative rationality (putting aside the realism of such an assumption) with 
reason in which ideas of what is an economic good and a social good must be defined and 
defended rather than simply assumed to spontaneously emerge in a way that need not be 
defined or debated because it is self-evident. What this reversal in ethos does not demand by 
virtue of its form, however, is that once a product or practice has been subject to such 
scrutiny it will then be administered rather than marketised. This does not necessarily follow 
from the reversal of ethos. Whether it does is an additional argument regarding the role of 
regulation and monitoring in specific approaches to sets of reforms. As such, if a product or 
practice is genuinely an economic and social good in the context of the finance system then 
its originators need not fear its scrutiny on the basis that it will be prevented.   
 
 This does, however, raise further practical issues regarding the nature of finance 
based on such an ethos since the real basis of profitability for many products and practices is 
not their role as innovations creating market efficiencies per se but rather the restricted 
market in them based on the control of the innovation. Put another way it is precisely the 
nature of privatising information that creates the profitability of practice and product 
construction. There is a clear contradiction here between the idea of efficiency and the reality 
of practice and that, in turn, may be one reason why a product or practice is prevented (or 
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may be a reason for its public dissemination if its good is more than its current profit margin 
potential). In either case a variety of further issues are raised, for example, whether a financial 
patent system might be an appropriate way to match public needs and private motives. This, 
in turn raises new issues of the reification of power in regulatory reform. What it does not do, 
however, is close down the potential of thinking in terms of issues of ethos.   
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